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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case 
No. 6650 
KEMMERER COAL COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE 
OF ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
Attorney for Defendant, specially 
appearing in support of defen-
dant's motion to quash service. 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEMMERER COAL COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 6650 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE 
OF ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE 
STATEMENT 
This proceeding is original in character, brought by the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah against the 
Kemmerer Coal Company, a Wyoming corporation, to 
obtain from this Court a writ of mandamus compelling the 
defendant corporation to secure payment of compensation 
for industrial accidents for three of its employees who reside 
in the State of Utah. 
The defendant Kemmerer Coal Company has made a 
special appearance and moved to quash the service of the 
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2 
alternative writ issued by this Court. In substance the 
defendant contends, first, that· it is a foreign corporation, 
and that as such under its charter it has no power to do 
business in this state, and, second, it has not done any busi-
ness and is not doing any business in the State of Utah. 
For these reasons it contends that this Court has no 
jurisdiction over this corporate defendant; and, further, 
that to construe the statutes of the State of Utah so as to 
permit service upon the defendant company by delivering 
a copy of the alternative writ of mandate to a mere solicitor 
of orders is (a) to violate Section 8 of Article I of the Consti-
tution of the United States, which provides that the Federal 
Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among 
the several states; and (b) to deny equal protection of the 
laws as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States; 
and (c) to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States by abridging the privileges 
and immunities of the defendant and depriving said defend-
ant of liberty and property without due process of law. 
The facts as they are shown by the record are contained 
in affidavits of L. M. Pratt and R. E. Davis. These affi-
davits set forth in full the character of the defendant and 1 
the manner in which it has done and, is now doing its busi-
ness. An attempt has been made in these affidavits to 
make a complete statement of all facts which either party 
to this proceeding has deemed in any wise relevant. These 
facts will be referred to specifically in a consideration of 
the points herein presented. 
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POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT KEMMERER COAL COMPANY HAS 
NO POWER TO COMPLY WITH THE PEREMPTORY 
WRIT PRAYED FOR BY THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
SAID DEFENDANT IS RESTRICTED BY ITS CORPOR-
ATE CHARTER FROM DOING BUSINESS, OR HAVING 
A PLACE OF BUSINESS, IN ANY OTHER STATE 
THAN THAT OF WYOMING. 
This corporation was organized under the laws of the 
State of Wyoming August 11, 1897. At that time and 
ever since the laws of that state required the articles of 
every private corporation to state, among other things, 
the name of the town and county in which the operations of 
said company shall be carried on (Sec. 28-101 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Wyoming, 1931), and further required 
that "if any company shall be formed under this article 
for the purpose of carrying on any part of its business in 
any place outside of the state, the certificate shall so 
'State." (The certificate means articles.) (Sec. 28-116, 
Revised Statutes of Wyoming, 1931.) 
These sections of the Wyoming statute authorizing 
the creation of corporations under the laws of that state 
were in full force and effect as early as the year 1887, and 
have not been altered or amended since Wyoming became 
a state in 1890. (See Section 3034, Revised Statutes of 
Wyoming, 1899.) 
Such statutes and the articles of incorporation, or, as 
they are often called in the State of Wyoming, the certificate 
of incorporation, constitute the corporate charter. When-
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4 
ever the articles and the statute conflict, the statute, of 
course, controls. 
The articles of incorporation of this Kemmerer Coal 
Company are in accord with such statutes. Article 6 pro-
vides: 
"Sixth : The principal place of business of the 
said corporation shall be at Kemmerer, Uinta County, 
Wyoming, and the business of said corporation shall 
be carried on in Uinta County, Wyoming, and at 
such other places in the State of Wyoming as the 
trustees shall designate." 
(In the Wyoming statutes, particularly those of early 
date, the word "trustees" is used synonymously with the 
word "directors.") 
It is generally fundamental that a corporation has no 
legal existence beyond the territorial limits of the state 
where it was organized. Its power to carry on its business 
outside of the state may be conferred by the express terms 
of its charter, or, in the absence of any statutory stipulation 
to the contrary, it may be implied from such express terms. 
Where, however, it is restricted to the state creating it, 
then such restriction must be obeyed. Under the plain terms 
of these statutes a corporation organized in Wyoming cannot 
carry on any part of its business in any place outside of 
Wyoming unless its articles .or certificate so provide. 
As early as 1839, thirty years before Wyoming became 
even a territory, Mr. Chief Justice Taney of the United 
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5 
States Supreme Court announced a fundamental rule as 
follows: 
"And if the law creating a corporation does not 
by the true construction of the words used in the 
charter, give it the right to exercise its powers be-
yond the limits of the state, all contracts made by 
it in other states would be void." 
Bank of Augusta V. Earl, 13 Peters, 519; 10 L. 
Ed. 275 (1839). 
As early as 1856, Mr. Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black 
stated the fundamental rule as follows : 
"This case requires us to give a construction to 
the charter of a private corporation. The frequency 
of such cases excites some surprise, when we reflect 
that an act of incorporation is and aways must be 
interpreted by a rule so simple that no man, whether 
lawyer or layman, can misunderstand or misapply 
it. That which a company is authorized to do by its 
act of incorporation it may do; beyond that, all its 
acts are illegal. And the power must be given in 
plain words or by necessary implication. All powers 
not given in this direct and unmistakable manner 
are withheld. It is strange that the attorney general, 
or anybody else, should complain against a company 
that keeps itself within bounds, which are always 
thus clearly marked, and equally strange that a 
company which has happened to transgress them 
should come before us with the faintest hope of being 
sustained. In such cases ingenuity has nothing to 
work with, since nothing can be either proved or 
disproved by logic or inferential reasoning. If you 
assert that a corporation had certain privileges, show 
us the words of the legislature conferring them. 
Failing in this, you must give up your claim, for 
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nothing else can possibly avail you. A doubtful char-
ter does not exist; because whatever is doubtful is 
decisively certain against the corporation." (Italics 
inserted.) 
Commonwealth v. Erie & Northeast R. R. Co., 
27 Pa. St. 339; 67 Am. Dec. 471 (1856). 
It is the contention of the defendant that Article 6 above 
quoted is in all respects the legal equivalent of an express 
restriction. Especially is this true when it is read in con-
nection with the sections of the Wyoming statute above 
quoted. This article gives the directors power to establish 
places of business "at such other places in the State of 
Wyoming as the trustees shall designate." This article does 
not give such directors power to designate any place outside 
of the State of Wyoming as a place of business; in fact, the 
article, without the aid of the Wyoming statutes, is a nega-
tion of any power or powers in the directors to establish a 
place of business for this corporation outside of the State of 
Wyoming. The article, in connection with the statutes above 
quoted, needs no "inferential reasoning" to establish that 
the corporation cannot carry on its business, or any part 
of that business, in any place beyond the boundaries, of 
Wyoming. As Justice Black said, "ingenuity has nothing 
to work with." 
Under such circumstances it would appear to be un-
necessary to cite authorities, but in order that the Court 
may have the benefit of the research of counsel, the defen-
dant cites: 
Stickle v. Liberty Cycle Co., 32 Atl. 708; Court 
of Chancery of New Jersey, 1895. 
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This case does not appear to have been officially re-
ported. It involved the granting of a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining the removal of a manufacturing 
plant from the State of New Jersey. Mahlon Pitney, Es-
quire, afterwards Justice Pitney of the United States Su-
preme Court, appeared in support of the motion. 
The certificate of the corporation involved in that case 
provided that the business of the company could be carried 
on outside of the State of New Jersey to the extent of selling 
the manufactured products of the company. The statute 
of New Jersey provided that "it shall be lawful for any 
corporation of the state to conduct its business out of the 
state, though not provided for in the certificate of incorpora-
tion." 
(It will be noticed that the New Jersey statute is the 
antithesis of the Wyoming statute,-New Jersey making it 
lawful for the corporation to conduct its business outside 
of the state without any express provision being contained 
in the charter of the corporation, whereas, Wyoming makes 
such an express provision necessary.) 
Vice-Chancellor Emery said : 
"The parties to the incorporation certifical~ 
have, if they so choose, the right to the protection 
of the property and plant of the company, and of 
their interests in it as shareholders, either as a going 
concern or in liquidation, under the laws of New 
Jersey, rather than those of other states or countries; 
and where, as here, the certificate provides for the 
location of the manufacturing plant and business 
within this state, and specifies that the business to 
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be carried on without the state is the sale of the man-
ufactured articles, the removal of the manufacturing 
plant and business out of the jurisdiction of the 
state seems to be a material and fundamental change 
in the object and purpose of the company." (32 
Atl. 709.) 
In Wyoming, if any company is formed for the purpose 
of carrying on any part of its business in any place outside 
of Wyoming, the certificate shall so state. (Revised Statutes 
of Wyoming, Sec. 28-116.) This is the language of the Wy-
oming statute and that statute is a part of the charter of 
this Kemmerer Coal Company. Its terms are too clear for 
construction. No argument can be tolerated as to its mean-
ing. 
Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 
64; 6 L. Ed. 552 (1827) ; 
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace 
Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; 35 L. Ed. 55 (1891); 
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424; 46 L. Ed. 
264 (1902); 
State v. Portland General Electric Co., 52 Ore. 
502; 95 Pac. 722· (1908) ; 
Schwab v. Potter Co., 194 N. Y. 409; 87 N. E. 
670 (1909) ; 
Prairie Slough Fishing Co. v. Kessler, 252 Mo. 
424; 159 s. w. 1080 (1913) ; 
Connellsville Ry. Co. v. Markleton Hotel Co., 
247 Pa. 565; 93 Atl. 635 (1915) ; 
People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75; 197 
N. E. 537 (1935) ; 
Radalj v. Union Savtngs & Loan Assn., 138 Pac. 
(2d) 984 Wyo. (1943) (not yet officially 
reported). 
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These nine cases, ranging chronologically from 1827 
to 1943 and geographically from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
illustrate the rule that the express mention of one thing or 
one mode of action in a statute or written instrument ex-
cludes all other things or modes of action, even though there 
may be no negative words expressly prohibiting such other 
things or such modes of action. 
In 1827, in the Dandridge case above cited, Mr. Justice 
Story said: 
"And it may be safely assumed that a corpora-
tion can make no contracts and do no acts, either 
within or without the state that creates it, except 
such as are authorized by its charter, and those acts 
must also be done by such officers or agents and in 
such manner as the charter authorizes." 
In 1891, in the case of Central TransportaUon Co., above 
cited, Mr. Justice Gray said : 
"The clear result of these decisions may be 
summed up thus: The charter of a corporation, read 
in the light of any general laws which are applicable, 
is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration 
of those powers implies the exclusion of all others 
not fairly incidental." 
In 1902, in the case of Tucker v. Alexandroff, above 
cited, Mr. Justice Brown said: 
"Upon general principles applicable to the con-
struction of written instruments the enumeration of 
certain powers with respect to a particular subject 
matter is a negation of all other analogous powers 
with respect to the same subject matter." 
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In 1908, in the case of State v. Portland Electric Co., 
above cited, Mr. Justice Eakin quoted Mr. Justice Taney as 
follows: 
"Now it is the well settled doctrine of this court 
that a corporation created by statute is merely a 
creature of the law, and can exercise no powers ex-
cept those which the law confers upon it, or which 
are incident to its existence." 
At another place in the same opinion Justice Eakin said: 
"The corporation has no rights of property ex-
cept those derived from the provisions of the char-
ter ; nor can it exercise any powers over the property 
it holds except those with which. its charter has 
clothed it." 
In 1909, in the case of Schwab v. Potter Co., above cited, 
Mr. Justice Vann said: 
"Corporations cannot resort to ingenious and 
original methods of action with the freedom of indi-
viduals, for they are confined to those expressly 
authorized by statute and such as are incidental 
thereto and necessary to carry them into effect." 
And again in the same opinion he said : 
"Whatever is done by a corporation without 
authority is done in violation of law, for all action, 
not authorized directly or indirectly, is prohibited." 
In 1913, in the case of Prairie Slough Fishing Co. v. 
Kessler, above cited, Mr. Justice Williams said: 
"It is a well-settled rule that when the organic 
or statutory law specifies the powers a given corpora-
tion may exercise, or the property it may hold, such 
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specification by implication excludes all other pow-
ers or rights, except such incidental or subordinate 
rights and powers as may be necessary to an exercise 
of the powers and rights expressly given." 
In 1915, in the case of Connellsville v. Markleton, above 
cited, Mr. Justice Mestrezat said: 
"There are certain fundamental principles which 
should not be overlooked in construing the charter 
of a corporation. If a particular power is omitted 
from those enumerated in the charter, it is to be 
taken as a prohibition against its exercise, unless 
there is an imperative implication of its inclusion. 
What is not given by express words or by necessary 
implication is withheld." 
In 1935, in the case of People v. Wiersema, above cited, 
Mr. Justice Jones said: 
"The rule that the expression of one thing or 
one mode of action in an enactment excludes any 
other, even though there may be no negative words 
prohibiting it, has been the settled law of this state 
since 1852." 
In 1943, Mr. Justice Blume, speaking for the Wyoming 
Supreme Court, quoted with approval from Mr. Fletcher on 
Corporations as follows: 
"This rule is expressed in the maxim, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. * * * If a particu-
lar power is omitted from those enumerated in the 
charter, it is to be taken as a prohibition against its 
exercise unless there is an imperative implication of 
its inclusion." (7 Fletcher, Sec. 3648.) 
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In concluding his discussion of this maxim, Mr. Fletcher 
says: 
"In other words, an enumeration of corporate 
powers implies the exclusion of all other powers 
except such as are essential to corporate existence 
and to the enjoyment and exercise of powers express-
ly conferred." 
7 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations, Sec. 3648. 
In determining this motion to quash the service of the 
alternative writ of mandamus it should be remembered that 
such alternative writ must be served in the same manner as 
a summons in a civil action, and that when a peremptory 
writ has been issued and directed to any corporation, board 
or person upon whom it has been personally served, then 
if such person "without just excuse" (quoting the statute) 
has refused or neglected to obey the same, the Court may 
upon motion impose a fine not exceeding $500. (Sections 
104 ... 68-13 and 104-68-14, Utah Code Annotated.) 
The alternative writ in this case has been served upon 
L. M. Pratt, Jr., who has no other function or power than 
that of soliciting orders. It is difficult for one to assume 
that any court would attempt the enforcement of a writ of 
mandate against some employee, officer or even a board 
when such employee, officer or board had no lawful power 
or authority to comply with the directions of the mandate. 
The defendant Kemmerer Coal Company respectfully 
contends that without an amendment of its articles of in-
corporation ::~.s they now exist, and as they have existed 
since it was organized in 1897, it could not lawfully estab-
lish a place of business in this state. Any one of its stock-
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holders, all of whom reside beyond the confines of Utah, 
could enjoin the corporation from carrying on any of its 
business outside of the State of Wyoming. These stock-
holders have a right to confine this corporation in the 
carrying on of its business and every part thereof either 
to Kemmerer, Wyoming, or such other places in the State 
of Wyoming as the directors shall designate. In order 
for this corporation to do business in any other state than 
Wyoming, it must have a legislative grant of power from 
Wyoming. It could obtain that power only by its incorpora-
tors stating in the articles signed by them that the corpora-
tion being formed had as one of its purposes the carrying 
on of business outside of the State of Wyoming. If the 
corporation had the consent of its creator, the State of 
Wyoming, then in order for it to carry on business in the 
State of Utah the consent of the latter would be necessary, 
but without the authority of the former, the consent of 
the latter is of no consequence. 
Surely the courts of Wyoming will not compel a viola-
tion of the laws of Utah, nor will the courts of Utah compel 
a violation of the laws of Wyoming. In the language of 
Justice Black, "It is strange that the attorney general, or 
anybody else, should complain against a company that keeps 
itself within bounds." (67 Am. Dec. 471, supra.) This 
eompany has kept itself within bounds, and these bounds 
are the boundaries of Wyoming. 
As early as 1913, the Honorable John A. Marshall, 
judge of the United States District Court for the district 
of Utah, held in a contested case entitled "Onisha v. Kem-
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merer Coal Comparny," No. 947, that the Kemmerer Coal 
Company could not under the law be served with summons 
in this jurisdiction. That order sustaining a motion to 
quash was dated August 11, 1913. 
Erwin Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co., 
2 Utah 74 (1878). 
In this early case the Territorial Supreme Court of 
Utah said: 
"A corporation has no powers but such as are 
granted either in express terms or by direct and 
necessary implication." 
Railroad v. Power Co., 23 Utah 22; 63 Pac. 995 
(1901). 
In this case Mr. Justice Miner, speaking for the Su-
preme Court of this state, said: 
"A corporation of Colorado coming into this 
state cannot bring with it powers. with which it is 
not endowed in Colorado. It can only have an exist-
ence under the express laws of the state where it is 
created, and can exercise no power which is not 
granted by its charter or some legislative act." 
If this corporation cannot under its charter voluntarily 
come into this state, then it is submitted that this court will 
not compel this corporation to do that which would be 
unlawful. The function of a writ of mandamus is to enforce 
obedience to law and not disobedience, and where it appears 
that the acts sought to be coerced are unauthorized or for-
bidden by law, or that they tend to aid an unlawful purpose, 
the writ will be denied. Mandamus will not lie to compel 
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one person to do a particular thing which he has no power 
or authority to do. 
It is submitted that this corporation has no right or 
authority under its charter to submit itself to the jurisdic-
tion of this court in this proceeding. Even if it shall be 
assumed that the defendant corporation has been doing busi-
ness in this state, which assumption under the facts as 
shown by the record would be erroneous, still this court 
will be without power in this proceeding to compel a further 
violation of law on the part of the defendant. 
State v. National Salt Co., 126 Mich. 644; 86 
N. W. 124 (1901). 
In this case the Supreme Court of Michigan held that 
if the corporation did business in the State of Michigan 
without a compliance with the state law, it did so at 1ts 
own risk; that it was subject to a suit by quo warranto, 
or perhaps to criminal penalties, but that a writ of man-
damus could not be obtained. 
It cannot be anticipated that a writ of mandamus would 
be issued to compel this corporation to do that which 
would be a violation of its charter and therefore illegal. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT IS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE; IT 
HAS NEVER COME INTO THIS STATE. IT IS NOT 
NOW DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND NEVER HAS DONE BUSINESS IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH; THEREFORE IT IS NOT AMENABLE TO 
THE PROCESS OR JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT .. 
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1. Th1e Corporation: It was organized under the laws 
of the State of Wyoming August 11, 1897, under the general 
laws of that state. Its principal place of business was at 
Kemmerer, Uinta County, Wyoming (now Lincoln County), 
"and the business of said corporation shall be carried on in 
Uinta County, Wyoming, and at such other places in the 
State of Wyoming as the trustees shall designate." Under 
the statute of Wyoming then existing, and still existing, if 
.any corporation was formed under the laws of Wyoming 
for the purpose of carrying on any part of its business 
in any place outside of the State, its certificate or articles 
were required to state that fact. These articles or this 
certificate of this company did not state such fact, but 
.limited the directors to designating places in the State of 
Wyoming. 
2. Business and Extent Thereof: The corporation im-
mediately after its organization commenced to mine and 
produce coal at or near Kemmerer-the place called "Fron-
tier" being really a part of Kemmerer. For the last fifteen 
_years, and prior thereto, it has produced large quantities of 
,coal and has sold the same at Kemmerer, free on board the 
coal cars of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
now the Union Pacific. This coal has been shipped to 
fourteen different states, Iowa and Minnesota being the 
,eastern limits and the Pacific Coast states the western limits. 
During the last fifteen years it has produced an average of 
-400,000 tons per year. All contracts for the sale of coal 
have been made at its home and only office at Kemmerer, 
Wyoming. The consumer has paid the freight. It has sent 
.solicitors from time to time into practically all of these 
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fourteen states for the purpose of soliciting business to be 
accepted by the company for the purchase of coal. No one 
has had any authority to make any contract for this com-
pany outside of the State of Wyoming, and no one has 
attempted to exercise any such power or authority. 
3. Activities in the State of Utah: For over thirty 
years it has had some man or men in the State of Utah for 
the purpose of keeping the company acquainted with the 
business opportunities as they existed in this intermountain 
country. The company has recognized that Salt Lake City 
and Ogden are common points, so far as railroads are con-
cerned, and that the State of Utah is a great producer of 
coal, and that the mines operating in Utah are strong com-
petitors in the coal business when there is any coal business. 
4. Coal Consumed in Utah and Market Conditions: In 
the last fifteen years there has been shipped into the State 
of Utah for consumption therein less than one-half of one 
per cent. of this company's annual output; putting it in 
another way, about 1500 tons per year. In fact, there has 
been no substantial market in Utah for this company's coal. 
The reason is explained in the afffidavit filed in support of 
, the motion to quash, and that reason is that the mines of 
Utah produce more coal many times over than can be con-
sumed in this state, and the freight rates between Kem-
merer and Salt Lake City are twenty-five cents per ton 
higher on Wyoming coal than on Utah coal. This would 
mean the consumer would pay twenty-five cents more a ton 
if he burned Wyoming coal than if he burned Utah coal, 
and the coal from one state is equal in quality to the coal 
from the other state. 
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At times, on account of some difficulty, the Utah mines 
have been unable to satisfy the needs of the people of Utah, 
and the Wyoming mines have stepped in and relieved the 
difficulty, but instances of this character have been excep-
tional and occur only when such difficulties exist. It is suf-
ficient to say that there has been no continuous flow of the 
products of the defendant into the State of Utah. Of course, 
at the present time, on account of war conditions, all coal 
companies are inactive in their solicitation of orders. Every-
body is seeking to buy and the companies are engaged in 
explaining why they cannot deliver, but the foregoing state-
ments refer to normal conditions. 
5. The Office in Utah and its Three Employees: For 
many years, even prior to the year 1913, this company has 
had what is generally called a "sales agency" in Utah, that 
is, it has had one or more men situated in Utah and traveling 
out from Utah to the northwestern states, and these men 
have solicited persons using coal to buy coal from the Kem-
merer Coal Company. Whenever a customer is found and an 
order obtained from him, that order is sent to the home and 
only office of the Kemmerer Coal Company at Kemmerer, 
Wyoming. If the order is accepted, the coal ordered is loaded 
on cars and by the railroad transported to the buyer. 
At the present time R. A. Davis, George F. Eble and 
L. M. Pratt, Jr., are the employees who live in the State of 
Utah. For their convenience an office has been provided for 
them, situated at 412 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That office is equipped with telephone connection, and there 
has been inserted in the Salt Lake City Directory a statement 
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giving the location of the office and that the company pro-
duces coal at its mines situated in the State of Wyoming. 
The office is maintained for the purpose of facilitating the 
work of these men in obtaining orders throughout the wes-
tern states and for no other purpose. By maintaining such 
room and allowing those men to reside in the State of Utah, 
they can keep acquainted with the conditions in Utah and 
at the same time avoid traveling a considerable distance to 
the territory where they may find customers in other states. 
Similar offices are maintained by the company in Grand 
Island, Nebraska, and at Walla Walla, Washington. 
These men have no authority to bind the company with 
any contract, and occupy, when they are in Salt Lake City, 
this office for their convenience. The company has in that 
office desks and chairs and other office furniture, having 
a value not to exceed $400; and these men have three auto-
mobiles which from time to time come into Utah from the 
State of Wyoming, bearing Wyoming licenses, and are from 
time to time for temporary purposes and convenience kept 
here in this state. 
T. J. O'Brien was the predecessor of R. A. Davis as 
a director of the sales force out of Utah. T. J. O'Brien has 
lived in Salt Lake City for many years; maintains a home 
at the Alta Club in this city. He is now seriously and hope-
lessly ill. It so happened that in 1933, he was elected presi-
dent of this company, and he did not change his residence 
on that account, but he does and has done no official cor-
porate act in this city. He, of course, when able and when 
necessary, gives directions to these men who solicit orders. 
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So far as his duties as president might be involved, he per-
forms all of those official duties entirely in the State of 
Wyoming. 
When the company was first organized, M. S. Kem-
merer of Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania, was president. When 
he died in 1924, Patrick J. Quealy of Kemmerer, Wyoming, 
became president, and upon his death, John L. Kemmerer of 
Short Hills, New Jersey, became president. He resigned in 
October, 1933, and T. J. O'Brien became president. (The 
company was not in Pennsylvania when M. S. Kemmerer 
was president; nor was it in New Jersey when his. son was 
president; nor is it in Utah because O'Brien is president.) 
This company has acted in perfect good faith about this 
matter, and has believed that what, if anything, was done 
in the State of Utah was in accord with the laws of said 
state. In 1913, the suit of Onisha vs. Kemmerer Coal Com-
pany was brought in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah. Service was made upon Mr. O'Brien, 
who was then the so-called "sales agent" of this company,. 
having his office at 160 South Main Street. A special ap-
pearance was made by the Kemmerer Coal Company in the 
suit referred to and the defendant moved to quash the service 
of the summons on the ground it was not amenable to process 
in this state because it was not doing business in said state. 
This motion was fully and fairly presented to the judge of 
the United States District Court, the Honorable John A. 
Marshall. After argument, that motion was sustained and 
the company continued to act as it had theretofore acted, 
believing that it had a right to solicit orders in the State of 
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Utah if it saw fit, but on account of the market conditions 
and the freight rates above explained, it has not been able to 
market any substantial quantity of coal for consumption in 
the State of Utah. \Vhatever coal has been produced by it 
that has been consumed in the State of Utah has been in-
considerable in amount, not to exceed an average of 1500 
tons per year. 
These are substantially the facts as they exist and have 
existed since the organization of the defendant company in 
1897. If any fact relative to the question before the Court 
has been omitted from this statement, the omission is unin-
tentional. The company has in good faith never complied 
with the laws of this state relative to foreign corporations, 
and as is indicated in Point I of this brief, does not believe 
that it has any corporate power to establish a place of busi-
ness in any other state than that of Wyoming. 
Under the facts as stated, this company contends that 
it has not done any business in the State of Utah, and that 
therefore service upon L. M. Pratt, Jr., or R. A. Davis or 
upon anyone, cannot be made under the law. The solicitor's 
office is not a "place of business" within the meaning of 
Section 104-5-11 Utah Statutes. 
The defendant, in support of its contention that it is 
not amenable to the process of the courts of this state 
because it is not doing and has not done businenss within 
this state, will cite and discuss certain precedents which it 
believes to be controlling, and which it believes will aid this 
court in determining the question presented. The defendant 
does not pretend that the cases hereinafter cited are in any 
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sense exhaustive; neither does defendant contend that the 
term "doing business" has any well defined meaning. As 
one author put it, "what is meant by 'doing business' in a 
given state or other locality is something approached from 
so many angles that the subject appears a mass of con-
fusion." 
Generally speaking, the United States Supreme Court 
has decided each case of this character upon the facts 
brought before it, and has laid down no all-embracing rule 
by which it may be determined what constitutes "doing 
business" by a foreign corporation in such a manner as to 
subject it to a given jurisdiction. The business must be 
such in character and extent as to warrant the inference 
that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction 
and the laws of the district in which it is served and in 
which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been 
served with process. The corporation, according to the 
prevailing authorities, must be present. It must be there 
in fact, or, as some of the cases say, it must be actually 
transacting business in the state with a fair measure of 
permanence and continuity. Some substantial part of its 
main business must be done within the state. 
After these statements have been made the problem still 
remains unsolved. We have entered a revolving door, and 
after one revolution of that door we find that the point of 
exit is identical with the point of entrance. 
When is the corporation present? When the word 
"presence" is used in the solution of this question we mean 
actual presence. Jurisdiction does not rest upon the fiction 
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of constructive presence. A corporation may have agents in 
every state other than that of its creation, and yet it may 
be actually present only in the state where it is organized. 
Before it can be amenable to the process of any other state 
it must be actually present in that state. 
Bank of America v. Whitney National Bank, 
261 U. S. 171; 67 L. Ed. 594 (1923). 
In this case Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unan-
imous court, said : 
"The sole question for decision is whether, at 
the time of the service of the process, the defendant 
was doing business within the district in such a 
manner as to warrant the inference that it was 
present there." 
And again he said : 
"In this respect their relationship is comparable 
to that of a factor acting for an absent principal. 
The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations, in 
the absence of statutory requirement or express 
consent, does not rest upon a fiction of constructive 
presence, like qui facit per alium facit per se. It 
flows from the fact that the corporation itself does 
business in the state or district in such a manner and 
to such an extent that its actual presence there is 
established. That the defendant was not in New 
York, and, hence, was not found within the district, 
is clear." 
In the same year the same justice held a statute of 
Minnesota invalid under the commerce clause of the F'ederal 
Constitution. This statute provided : 
"Any foreign corporation having an agent in 
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this state for the solicitation of freight and passen-
ger traffic or either thereof over its lines outside of 
this state may be served with summons by delivering 
a copy thereof to such agent." 
The Court held : 
"Solicitation of traffic by railroads, in states 
remote from their lines, is a recognized part of the 
business of interstate transportation." 
and that such a statute as that above quoted was invalid 
in that it unduly obstructed and burdened interstate com-
merce. 
Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co., 262 
U. S. 312; 67 L. Ed. 996 (1923) ; 
Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 205 U. S. 530; 51 L. Ed. 
916 (1907); 
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197; 59 
L. Ed. 193 (1914) ; 
Riverside Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 
189; 59 L. Ed. 910 (1910) ; 
Bank of America v. Whitney Central National 
Bank, 2·61 U.S. 171; 67 L. Ed. 594 (1923); 
Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Gregory, 
289 U. S. 85; 77 L. Ed. 1047 (1923). 
These cases, in connection with those cited and con-
sidered in the opinions rendered in such cases, thoroughly 
illustrate the law as declared by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Devaga, Inc. v. Lincoln Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. (2d) 
164 (1928); 
Roark v. American Distilling Co., 97 Fed. (2d) 
297 (1938); 
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Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec-
tric Co., 100 Fed. (2d) 770 (1938) ; 
lVhitaker v. McFadden Pub. Co., 105 Fed. (2d) 
44 (1939) ; 
Eastern Livestock Co. v. Dickinson, 107 Fed. 
(2d) 116 (1939). 
STATE CASES, INCLUDING UTAH 
Farmers Union Livestock Commission, Inc., v. 
District Court, 93 Utah 181; 72 Pac. (2d) 
488 (1937) ; 
Park, Davis & Co. v. Fifth Judicial District 
Court, 93 Utah 217; 72 Pac. (2d) 466 
(1937); 
Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber 
Packing Co., 93 Utah 414; 73 Pac. (2d) 
1272 (1937) ; 
Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 288 Pa. 
245; 135 Atl. 757 (1927). 
Of the cases above cited the Green case may be said to 
be the leader. The opinion was written by Mr. Justice 
Moody in 1907. It was at one time designated as somewhat 
extreme. It was followed and relied upon by United States 
District Judge Marshall in the Onisha case in 1913. (This 
is the case where the Kemmerer Coal Company was in-
volved.) As one reads the decisions he seems to discern a 
tendency on the part of the courts to depart from the doc-
trine of the Green case, and then after a few years the courts 
have gone back, and now seem to unhesitatingly follow that 
case. 
In the case of Whitaker v. McFadden Pub. Co., 105 Fed. 
(2d) 44, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
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of Columbia, speaking by Associate Justice Edgerton, with 
whom concurred Justices Stephens and Groner, said: 
"A foreign corporation is amenable to process 
to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of con-
sent, only if it is doing business within the state in 
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the 
inference that it is present there." (Citing authori-
ties.) "It is elementary that not all economic activ-
ity amounts to 'doing business' in this sense." 
The Court then referred to the facts in the Green case, 
pointing out that the railroad had maintained in Pennsyl-
vania an office and a district, freight and passenger agent 
and special employees who solicited passenger and freight 
business. These agents did not sell tickets over defendant's 
lines but they sold "prepaid orders" which entitled the holder 
to receive a ticket in Chicago. 
The Supreme Court said it was "obvious that defendant 
was doing" in Pennsylvania "a considerable business of a 
certain kind." Yet the Court ruled that "The business 
shown in this case was in substance nothing more than that 
of solicitation," and that the defendant was not, in the jur-
isdictional sense, doing business in the state." 
The Court referred to the American Tobacco case and 
said: 
"There the American company sold goods to 
Louisiana jobbers, who sold to retailers. The com-
pany sent drummers into the s·tate to solicit orders 
from retailers, to be turned over to the jobbers. 
These drummers made no sales, collected no money, 
and extended no credit. The Supreme Court held 
that the company was not doing business in Louisi-
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ana so as to permit service of process upon it. The 
Court distinguished International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, on the ground that there the 
agents not only solicited business but received pay-
ment." 
In the case of Da.vega., Inc., v. Lincoln Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. 
(2d) 164, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in the year 1928, had before it the question of the valid-
ity of the service of process. The opinion by Circuit Judge 
Augustus N. Hand is concurred in by Circuit Judges Swan 
and Learned Hand. The Court said that the "case is a close 
one," and under the facts as they are stated in the opinion, 
everyone must concede that Judge Hand was right in making 
that statement. The soliciting agent obtained orders in New 
York for the New York Company, amounting to about 
$20,000 per year. Sometimes he sold samples furnished by 
the company to people who were badly in need of furniture. 
Whenever such sales were made he received cash at the list 
price, and even extended credit in the case of accounts known 
to be acceptable to the company. The sales of these samples 
amounted to approximately $1000 per year. The Lincoln 
Company had two bank accounts in New York. It was listed 
in the directory of a building where it displayed its samples. 
We cannot review the facts in the Lincoln case and 
then compare those facts as they are set forth in the case 
at bar without coming to the conclusion that in this Kem-
merer Coal Company case there can be no doubt that the 
Kemmerer Coal Company is not now doing and has not 
done business in the State of Utah. 
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The Kemmerer Coal Company mines its coal in Wy-
oming. It, of course, cannot content itself with a mere min-
ing of coal. It must sell that coal in order to carry on busi-
ness. Sales of the coal are necessary to the company's exist-
ence. It sells this coal at Kemmerer, in the State of Wyom-
ing. It sends or has agents from time to time in fourteen 
different states, and, when conditions are normal and regu-
lar, these agents make all reasonable efforts to induce the 
consumers of coal to buy from the Kemmerer Coal Com-
pany. The solicitations, when successful, are followed by 
orders or offers to buy, and these orders or offers to buy 
are sent to the Kemmerer Coal Company, where at Kem-
merer they are either accepted or rejected. It is true that 
contracts result from the acts of solicitation, but the con-
tracts executed constitute the business, and the contracts 
are made at Kemmerer and executed at Kemmerer, in the 
State of Wyoming, and not elsewhere. No one of these 
solicitors does anything but obtain the order and send it 
to the home and only office of the Kemmerer Company. No 
coal is shipped to any solicitor or any person in the State 
of Utah, or in any other state, except as stated herein. The 
company has never had in the State of Utah any coal for 
sale. 
Now, it is not believed that any state in this Union can 
prohibit either a corporation of some other state or some 
natural person residing in some other state from soliciting 
customers to buy products produced in the sister state. 
In 1890, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the United 
States Supreme Court, said: 
"To carry on interstate commerce is not a fran-
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chise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right 
which every citizen of the United States is entitled 
to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States; and the accession of mere corporate 
facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on 
their business, cannot have the effect of depriving 
them of such right, unless Congress should see fit 
to interpose some contrary regulation on the subject. 
"It has frequently been laid down by this court 
that the power of Congress over interstate commerce 
is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce. Would 
anyone pretend that a State Legislature could pro-
hibit a foreign corporation,-an English or a French 
transportation company, for example,-from coming 
into its borders and landing goods and passengers 
at its wharves, and soliciting goods and passengers 
for a return voyage, without first obtaining a license 
from some state officer, and filing a sworn statement 
as to the amount of its capital stock paid in? And 
why not? Evidently because the matter is not within 
the province of state legislation, but within that of 
national legislation." 
Crutcher v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 141 
U. S. 47; 35 L. Ed. 649 (1890). 
In the case of Shambe v. Delaware R. R. Co. from 
Pennsylvania, supra, the court of that state gives a somewhat 
complete review of all the national cases upon the question 
involved herein. It states six requisite essentials to consti-
tute doing business : 
1. The company must be present in the state. 
2. By an agent. 
3. Duly authorized to represent it in the state. 
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4. The business transacted therein must be by and 
through such agent. 
5. The business engaged in must be sufficient in 
quantity and quality. 
6. There must be a statute making such corporations 
amenable to suit. 
And in the opinion it cites authorities for each of the six 
requisites. It discusses the Green and the Harvester cases, 
and compares one with the other, and finally concludes 
that the trial court was right in sustaining the defendant's 
motion to quash. 
The true meaning of the Utah Statutes relating to 
foreign corporations and service of process thereon should 
be ascertained, if possible. Sections 18-8-1 to 18-8-6, both 
inclusive, Utah Code Annotated, in effect provide that every 
corporation not organized under the laws of this state, 
except insurance companies, before doing any business 
within this state, shall file with the county clerk of the 
county in which its principal place of business in the state 
will be situated, a copy of its articles of incorporation and 
an acceptance of the provisions of the Constitution of the 
state, together with the designation of some person residing 
in said county upon whom all legal process may be served; 
and the same chapter also requires a filing of the foregoing 
papers with the Secretary of State. 
Section 18-8-5 states the disability of non-complying 
foreign corporations "doing business within this state." 
Section 104-5-11 states the rule for service of process 
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upon foreign corporations, and designates certain officers, 
and then says: 
"If there is none of such persons in this state, 
and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself 
out as having, an office or place of business in this 
state, or does business in the state, then upon the 
person doing such business or in charge of such 
office or place of business." 
It has already been pointed out in this brief that an 
alternative writ of mandate must be served in the same 
manner as a summons in a civil suit. (Section 104-68-13, 
Utah Statutes.) 
It is submitted and contended by this Kemmerer Coal 
Company that it has never been present in the State of 
Utah; that it has never done any business in the State of 
Utah; that it has no agent in the State of Utah who has 
any authority to represent it in such state; that the office 
maintained at 412 Boston Building, or, in former years at 
160 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was and is 
not a "place of business"; that the defendant has not violated 
any statute of this state; that it has never been here to 
violate a statute; that while it has sold coal in Wyoming, 
to be consumed in thirteen other states than Wyoming, it 
has not done business in any of those states. It has carried 
on all of its business in the State of Wyoming. It has not 
made a contract in the State of Utah, even in interstate 
commerce. 
Of course, when one engages in interstate commerce 
he is doing business. There can be no question about that, 
but the state statutes which require corporations to comply 
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with state laws, in order to be qualified to do business in 
some state, have no application to transactions wherein 
interstate commerce is being carried on, and if it shall 
be said that the Kemmerer Coal Company is engaged in 
interstate commerce, still, nevertheless, the Kemmerer Coal 
,Company is not present in the State of Utah. To engage 
in interstate commerce a corporation may or may not be 
present in some given state. 
Indulge illustration: There are in the State of Utah 
·certain mining companies which have been organized and 
exist under the laws of other states. They own no property 
in the states where they are created. All of their property 
is situated in the State of Utah, and all of their work is 
done in the State of Utah. These companies are here in 
this state. One large railroad company is organized and 
exists by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware. Its 
line of railroad extends from Denver, Colorado, to Salt Lake 
rCity, Utah. It transports freight and passengers back and 
forth between Colorado points and Utah points. It is engaged 
in interstate commerce. It is present in both Colorado 
~-and Utah. It is amenable to the service of process here 
because of its presence. The corporation is actually here. 
It advertises in Chicago and San Francisco but is neither 
in Chicago nor San Francisco. 
Take the case of Adva;nce-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v . 
. Stohl, 75 Utah 124; 283 Pac. 731 (1929). The plaintiff 
was a New York corporation, with head offices at La Porte, 
Indiana. It sold to the defendant a combination harvester . 
. He gave notes secured by a chattel mortgage on the har-
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vester. The action was to foreclose that chattel mortgage. 
It was contended that the plaintiff was a foreign corpora-
tion, and, not having complied with the laws of the state 
permitting it to do business within the state, the notes sued 
on were void, and that the plaintiff had no standing 
to prosecute its suit in the courts of Utah. 
One Winchester, operator of a garage and service sta-
tion at Tremonton, Utah, was designated as the local dealer, 
dealing in the machinery of the plaintiff. He had parts of 
machinery, for which he was personally responsible to the 
company, which he kept for sale. He advertised and solicited 
orders for this machinery and received commissions on 
sales made by and through him, according to the terms of 
the written contract between him and the company. He 
had no power to bind the company in any respect. The 
contract made by the defendant Stohl was in writing, and 
was in the form of an order signed by the defendant Stohl 
at Tremonton, Utah. The order went through the branch 
office located at Pocatello, Idaho, to the branch office of 
the company at La Porte, Indiana, where it was accepted 
in writing on July 5, 1927. 
The harvester which was the subject of contract was 
shipped by freight from La Porte, Indiana, via McCammon, 
Idaho, to Deweyville, Utah, and the defendant was notified 
that the harvester was at Deweyville. The defendant there-
upon went to the bank at Tremonton, Utah, and executed 
a receipt for the machinery and the notes and chattel mort-
gage involved in the suit. The defendant took possession 
of the machinery at Deweyville and took it to Tremonton. 
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'This Court held that "the transaction in suit is an 
interstate one." (75 Utah 131.) The mere fact that the 
machinery was set up by experts of the vendor, and adjusted 
so that it would work satisfactorily, did not make the trans-
action intrastate as distinguished from interstate. The 
execution of the notes and mortgages in Utah did not take 
the transaction out of interstate commerce, and it was held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain its action, not-
withstanding it had never complied with the laws of Utah 
with respect to foreign corporations doing business within 
the state. The Thresher Co. was not here. It came volun-
tarily for suit but not to do business. 
It must be clear that before a foreign corporation can 
be required to comply with the laws of this state it must 
be doing an intrastate business in Utah. No one should 
contend that any foreign corporation can lawfully do an 
intrastate business in Utah without complying with the laws 
of Utah relative to foreign corporations. If it comes into 
this state and does an intrastate business herein, then it 
cannot set up its non-compliance with the laws of Utah 
respecting foreign corporations to prevent its amenability 
to the service of process. No rational person would so 
contend. But no one should contend that the office or 
place of business referred to in Section 104-5-11 can include 
such an office or place of business as was maintained by 
-winchester at Tremonton, Utah, in the Thresher case. 
(75 Utah 124.) 
It seems to follow that no one 'Should contend that 
merely because the Kemmerer Coal Company has afforded 
its solicitors an office at 412 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
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City, where they can facilitate their work of soliciting 
orders, principally in the Northwestern and Pacific Coast 
states, that such an office is the office referred to in Sec-
tion 104-5-11 of the Utah statutes. 
L. M. Pratt, Jr., the person served with the alterna-
tive writ in this case, was not in charge of a place of busi-
ness, nor was he doing the business of the Kemmerer Coal 
Company in this state. He had no authority to bind the 
company with any contract. He was nothing but a solicitor 
of orders. He was a mere traveling man who, for his con-
venience, at times sat down at a desk in an office situated 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The company did not advertise 
or hold itself out as having a place of business in the State 
of Utah. It did have a telephone connection and it carried 
an advertisement in the Salt Lake City Directory as having 
mines at Kemmerer, Wyoming. The mere fact of such 
advertisement did not bring the defendant corporation into 
the State of Utah for the purpose of carrying on business 
in such state, or for any other purpose. The defendant, 
by reason of its charter, could not come into this state 
and it did not come in. 
It is well established by the authorities that the main-
tenance of a solicitor's office within a state does not neces-
sarily and of itself establish or constitute a doing business 
there, so as to subfect it to service of process. 
18 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations, Sec. 
8717; 
Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 Fed. (2d) 223 (1934). 
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The plaintiff brought suit for libel in the District of 
Columbia against the Tribune Company, an Illinois corpora-
tion engaged in publishing the Chicago Daily Tribune at 
Chicago, Illinois. The summons and a copy of the declara-
tion were served upon Arthur S. Henning, an employee of 
the defendant company in charge of the collection of news 
in the City of Washington. He forwarded such news to the 
Tribune office in Chicago. The evidence disclosed that 
the defendant maintained an office in Washington, in 
charge of Henning; that there were three other reporters 
and two telegraph operators employed in that office. The 
defendant company maintained a leased telegraph wire be-
tween Washington and Chicago, its home office. 
The business of Henning and his associates was to 
collect news in Washington and send it to Chicago. The news 
articles were there examined and used or discarded by 
defendant company and supplied to other newspapers. Hen-
ning had authority to purchase supplies for the office and 
maintain a telephone therein; employ, when business re-
quired, additional telegraph operators; all of which items 
were put in his expense account, which was paid from the· 
Chicago office. Henning's and the other employees' salaries 
were paid directly from the Chicago office. The rent and 
furnishings of the office in Washington were paid for di-
rectly from the Chicago office. It also appeared that the 
defendant company made no contracts of any nature in 
the District of Columbia, and that no employee of the 
defendant was authorized to enter into any contract out-
side of the State of Illinois. 
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On this statement the lower court held that the defen-
dant was not doing business in the District of Columbia 
within the meaning of the the terms of the statute, and could 
not be held subject to service of process there. 
On appeal Justice Van Orsdel, speaking for a unanimous 
court, held that the defendant was not amenable to the 
service of process in the District of Columbia, and if one 
will examine the list of cases relied upon he will find the 
Green case at the top of that list. 
Layne v. Tribune Co., 293 U. S. 572; 79 L. Ed. 
670 (1934). 
On October 8, 1934, the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied a writ of certiorari in this Layne case. 
It was correctly stated by Justice Folland of this court, 
and has been stated by some of the present justices, that: 
"The question is a federal one and we are bound 
by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States." (75 Utah, 131.) 
Wells Fargo & Co. of Mexico v. McArthur 
Brothers Mercantile Co., 42 Ariz. 405; 26 
Pac. (2d) 1021 (1938). 
Here was a case where the trial court read the Arizona 
statute and gave it a literal construction. If one will read 
Section 104-5-12 of the Utah statutes, and construe its lan-
guage literally, he can arrive at a conclusion somewhat 
logical but nevertheless one hundred per cent. wrong, that 
a defendant residing in Iowa, or some other state, who has 
never been in the State of Utah, can be sued in this state 
and summons served upon the defendant by publication. 
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One of our eminent district judges, now deceased, en-
joyed telling a story about a certain lawyer in this district, 
also deceased, who without attachment or any sequestration 
of property, sued upon a promissory note made by some 
defendant in Iowa. This attorney for the plaintiff attempted 
to take a default upon service by publication, and when the 
judge stated that he did not believe the Court had any juris-
diction of the person of the defendant, this attorney for the 
plaintiff seemed to feel sorry for the judge and called his 
attention to the provisions of the Utah statute above cited, 
and the judge suggested that the attorney for the plaintiff 
should read Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714; 24 L. Ed. 565 
(1877), and thereupon the proceeding ended without judg-
ment. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in the case above cited did 
not take the literal view taken by the trial court. Among 
other things it said : 
"That a foreign corporation may, with immunity 
from service of process, maintain an office for its 
own soliciting agent, has been held several times by 
the United States Supreme Court." (Citing the 
Green and McKibben cases.) 
It is not believed that it is necessary to cite further 
authorities to support the proposition that the defendant 
Kemmerer Coal Company is outside of the state and not in 
the State. 
Just recently, in December, 1943, this Court said: 
"Thus a corporation, other than a domestic cor-
poration, since it can act only through its agents, is 
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'out of the state' under that term as used in the stat-
ute, where it is not required to and does not maintain 
any agent within this state whose duty it is to look 
after such claims." 
In re Ewles' Estate, 143 Pac. (2d) 903 (1943). 
POINT III 
TO CONSTRUE THE STATUTES OF UTAH SO AS 
TO MAKE THIS KEMMERER COAL COMPANY AMEN-
ABLE TO THE PROCESS OF THE UTAH COURTS VIO-
LATES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATESINTHREEPARTICULARS: (a) SUCHACON-
STRUCTION OF THE UTAH STATUTES IS REPUG-
NANT TO AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 8 OF 
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE 
FEDERAL CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER TO REG-
ULATE COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES, 
BECAUSE SUCH STATUTES OF UTAH SO CON-
STRUED IMPOSE A SERIOUS, UNREASONABLE AND 
UNLAWFUL BURDEN UPON INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE; (b) SUCH STATUTES SO CONSTRUED ARE 
REPUGNANT TO AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES IN THAT SUCH STATUTES OF 
UTAH SO CONSTRUED DENY TO THE DEFENDANT 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; AND (c) 
SUCH STATUTES OF UTAH SO CONSTRUED ARE 
REPUGNANT TO AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 
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THE UNITED STATES IN THAT SUCH STATUTES SO 
CONSTRUED ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES AND IM-
MUNITIES OF THE DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVE 
SAID DEFENDANT OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Whether a corporation has submitted itself to the 
laws of a state other than that of its origin in such a way 
as to be bound by service of process therein is one of gen-
eral and not of local law, and in its final analysis it is one 
of due process of law under the Constitution of the United 
States. The decisions of the Supreme Court are not merely 
advisory but are absolutely controlling. 
If the Utah statute expressly provided that service of 
process could be made upon the defendant by leaving a copy 
of the summons or other writ with a solicitor of orders, 
such as L. M. Pratt, Jr., then such a statute would be uncon-
stitutional and void because it would violate not only the 
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, 
but also the due process of law provision, and it would inter-
fere with the right of the defendant to sell its product. It 
is a proper rule of construction that statutes should be 
construed and applied so as to avoid not only the conclusion 
that such statutes are unconstitutional, but also to avoid, 
grave doubts upon that score. 
International Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Donner 
Steel Co., 242 N. Y. 224; 151 N. E. 214 
(1926); 
Automotive Material Co. v. Standard M. P. Cor-
poration, 327 Ill. 367; 158 N. E. 698 (1927). 
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In the New York case Mr. Justice Crane delivered the 
qpinion, and with him concurred Chief Justice Hiscock, 
Justice Cardozo and Justice Lehman. Justices Pound, Mc-
Laughlin and Andrews dissented. Chief Justice Crane said: 
"One other principle we must mention. As the 
foreign corporation has the right without interfer-
ence by the state to conduct interstate business, 
which would doubtlessly include selling goods in this 
state (Hovey v. De Long Hook & Eye Co., supra), 
we must avoid such an application of this statute to 
the facts as may amount to an unlawful interference 
with interstate commerce. Tauza v. Susquehanna 
Coal Co., 115 N. E. 915, 917, 220 N. Y. 259, 267. A 
statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as 
to avoid, not only the conclusion that it is unconsti-
tutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. U. S. 
v. Jin Fuey Moy, 36 S. Ct. 258, 241 U. S. 394, 60 
L. Ed. 1061, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 854." (F'or quotation 
see 151 N. E. 216.) 
In the Tauza case the opinion was written by Justice 
Cardozo. That case is often cited to support the contention 
that a foreign corporation is doing business in some state. 
In view of the fact that he concurred in the case cited in 
151 N. E. 214, it is not believed that the Tauza case is in 
conflict with that case. 
In the Illinois case, 158 N. E. 638, Mr. Justice Duncan, 
speaking for a unanimous Illinois Supreme Court, said: 
"It is well established by the authorities of this 
country that a foreign corporation is not doing, car-
rying on, transacting, or engaging in business in a 
state, within the meaning of statutes like ours now 
under consideration, by merely appointing an agent 
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for the transaction of such future business therein. 
The qualifying of such agent for the transaction of 
such future business by taking a bond from such 
agent does not come within the meaning of the stat-
ute." (Citing authorities) "It is also established by 
the authorities of this country that a foreign corpora-
tion is not doing, transacting, carrying on, or engag-
ing in business in a state, within the meaning of 
such statutes, by the doing of acts therein which are 
merely preliminary to the transaction of the business 
in which the corporation is to engage, such as offer-
ing bids in the state on work to be performed therein, 
entering into a contract to perform suc4 work, or by 
giving a bond to secure performance of such con-
tract." (Citing authorities.) 
And again: 
"It is pointed out in those decisions that entering 
into a contract similar to the one now under con-
sideration, is undoubtedly 'transacting business' 
within the unlimited meaning of that term, but th(lf 
such is not the sense in which the term is used in the 
statutes, and that it means carrying on work or 
transacting the business for which the corporation 
was organized or in which it is to engage, and that 
it means performing the work or business called for 
by the contract. If such is not the true interpetation 
of the statute, foreign corporations in many in-
stances would be compelled to incur the expense of 
becoming licensed to do business in another state 
without any assurance whatever that they could 
contract to do such business or do such business after 
being licensed to do the same." (Italics inserted.) 
Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 
1222; 271 N. W. 204; 110 A. L. R. 1414 
(1937). 
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In the course of its opinion the Iowa Court said : 
"The Legisature had no constitutiona9power or 
authority to acquire jurisdiction over a citizen of a 
foreign state by service outside of the state of Iowa, 
by registered mail sent to an address beyond the bor-
ders of this state, and such service did not confer 
jurisdiction upon the commissioner to render a de-
cision fixing a personal liability upon the appellee 
corporation located in the state of West Virginia. 
To hold otherwise would render section 1459 un-
constitutional. Every presumption must be indulged 
in support of the constitutionality of an act, and it 
will be presumed that the lawmaking body intended 
the law to have force and effect within the constitu-
tional limitations." 
North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line 
R. R. Co., 105 Minn. 198; 117 N. W. 391 
(1908). 
In this suit the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
a Utah corporation, was served with summons by leaving 
a copy with D. M. Collins at the City of Minneapolis, Minne-
sota. Collins engaged in influencing shippers of freight and 
prospective passengers to use the lines of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. He induced various persons to buy 
tickets over the Union Pacific and Oregon Short Line. He 
was soliciting business for and advertising his employer. 
The company carried on this "business" in the State of 
Minnesota and had a permanent office in that state, as the 
Court said, "on a fairly extensive scale." 
In affirming the order quashing the service of summons, 
the Minnesota Court said : 
"Whether such a corporation is doing business in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
the state is a question of jurisdiction, and in its last 
analysis it is one of due process of law under the 
Constitution of the United States." 
It then cited the Green case and held the service invalid. 
This case is quoted from by the Arizona Court, 26 Pac. 
(2d) 1025. 
Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 
312; 67 L. Ed. 996 (1923) (Supra) 
The State of Minnesota had a statute authorizing ser-
vice of process to be made on an agent employed for the 
solicitation of passenger and freight traffic. The Supreme 
Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
held that such statute violated the commerce law of the 
Federal Constitution. 
These men, Pratt, Eble and Davis, under the affidavit 
filed in support of the motion to quash, are employed by the 
defendant by virtue of contracts of employment made in 
the State of Wyoming. They travel back and forth from 
Wyoming and the Pacific Coast. · Pratt· works in Idaho; 
Davis has jurisdiction from Laramie, Wyoming, west. They 
make no contracts for the defendant. They get no substan-
tial number of orders from Utah. Because of the reasons 
hereinbefore set forth, they live in Salt Lake City, and when 
they are here they use the office provided for their conven-
ience. They do not sell any coal and they have no property 
of the company in their possession. 
The office is provided with furniture having a value 
of not over $400, and this is an extreme statement. 
They operate from time to time automobiles of the company. 
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These automobiles are driven back and forth, under Wyom-
ing licenses, to the states in the Northwest. At times they 
are temporarily stopped in Utah. These men do not assist 
in the delivery of coal. The coal is put on the railroad cars. 
at Kemmerer, at the mines of the defendant, and from that 
time on the company is done with the transaction, except 
for the collection of its money when the coal is not paid for 
in cash. These three solicitors do not collect any of the 
money, except, possibly, it might be assumed that they would 
carry a check for the same if it were offered to them, but it 
is no part of their duties to collect accounts. If it can be 
said that they have done any business in Utah, then that 
business is interstate and not intrastate. The commerce is 
between the State of Wyoming and the state where the buyer 
of the coal may reside. 
Let us assume that these men are employed in interstate 
commerce, still the defendant is not doing business in the 
State of Utah. (158 N. E. 703.) To come in as an agent 
under Section 104-5-11 of the Utah statutes, the agent must 
be one having in fact a representative capacity and a deriva-
tive authority. Such an agent must be one actually appointed 
and representing the corporation as a matter of fact. The 
corporation cannot be represented here in this state unless 
it is doing business in Utah. (117 N. W. 392, supra.) 
The Minnesota court said : 
"Therefore, a foreign corporation sending its 
agents into this state impliedly consents that if they 
do for it any acts which constitute doing business 
within the state, as that term is defined by its courts, 
process against it may be served on such agents. The 
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solicitation of passenger and freight traffic in the 
state is not within that term." 
Spohn v. Industrial Commission, 138 0. St. 42; 
32 N. E. (2d) 554; 133 A. L. R. 951. 
In this case the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the 
legislature of that state "cannot, without placing an undue 
burden on interstate commerce, require a non-resident em-
ployer engaged in interstate commerce, whose employees 
enter the state in the course of their employment, to comply 
with the State Workmen's Compensation Law." 
Harrington v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 
544, 88 Pac. (2d) 548 (1939). 
In this case a brakeman was struck by a motor truck 
while he was crossing the street to open the gates which 
were maintained across an industrial railroad track to 
move two intrastate cars which were obstacles to the move-
ment of a feed car to the official place of spotting on the 
industrial track, where it would cease to move in interstate 
commerce. In other words, he. was engaged in interstate 
commerce at the time he was killed by being struck by a 
motor truck on the highway. There was no liability against 
the railroad company because there was no negligence. The 
Federal Employers' Liability Act gave no relief. This Court 
held that the Industrial Commission of Utah was without 
jurisdiction to proceed with the cause or award compensa-
tion under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and affirmed 
the act of the Industrial Commission in dismissing the 
application for want of jurisdiction. 
It should be presumed that the State of Wyoming has 
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·a compensation law. These three men, Davis, Pratt and 
Eble, are working out from Wyoming. Their legal residence 
and that of their families is not important or even material. 
Their contracts of employment are Wyoming contracts, and 
the place from which they work is Kemmerer, Wyoming. 
That is the place from which they get their compensation, 
and that is the place to which they make their official re-
ports and from which they receive their instructions. The 
mere fact that they do not physically travel to Kemmerer at 
the end of each week's work is of no legal consequence. 
In re Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519; 86 Pac. (2d) 1095 
(1939). 
In this case the Supreme Court of Wyoming gave an 
extra-territorial effect to its Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In 1941 the legislature of Wyoming expressly extended the 
benefits of that Workmen's Compensation law to employees 
hired and regularly employed in Wyoming receiving personal 
injuries or accident arising out of and in the course of such 
employment outside of the state. 
Chapter 47, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1941. 
An award of compensation under Wyoming's law would 
be a bar to any recovery for the same injury under Utah's 
law. 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 88 L. Ed. 161, 
decided by the United States Supreme Court 
Dec. 20, 1943. Lawyers Co-operative Pub-
lishing Co. Advance Sheet No.4. 
These men from a legal standpoint can work for the 
defendant but that work is Wyoming work wherever it may 
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be performed, becaus,e the defendant cannot and does not 
carry on its business in any other place than that state. 
Before a state may compel a foreign corporation to 
submit to its jurisdiction, or before such a corporation may 
be served with process in another state, it must be present 
in the state. An attempt to bring it into the state by service 
upon some agent or officer who does not carry with him his 
official character or function, is to violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. Solicitation of orders for business is not 
doing business, and the orderly, effective administration of 
justice demands an interpretation of these Utah statutes 
such as has been given by this Court in the numerous cases 
which it has decided, notably those contained in Volume 93 
of the Utah State Reports. 
The defendant does not believe it is necessary to discuss 
the effect of the residence of T. J. O'Brien, except to say 
that he has lived here for many years. Since 1933 he has 
been president of this company, but his residence and his 
presidency are in no wise connected. In the beginning, M.S. 
Kemmerer of Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania, was president. 
No one would have the temerity to contend that because 
Mr. Kemmerer lived in Pennsylvania the corporation was 
doing business in such state. On Mr. Kemmerer's death, 
P. J. Quealy became president. His residence and that of 
the defendant corporation were in the same state and in 
the same county of that state, but there is no legal connec-
tion between the residence of P. J. Quealy and that of the 
Kemmerer Coal Company. 
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On Mr. Quealy's death, John S. Kemmerer of Short 
Hills, New Jersey, became president. Will anyone contend 
that the corporation was doing- business in New Jersey 
because John Kemmerer lived in that state? For reasons of 
his own, and perhaps on account of his years, he resigned, 
and the stockholders elected T. J. O'Brien. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the service of the 
alternative writ of mandate made upon L. M. Pratt, Jr., 
should be quashed, because that service is illegal and void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAHLON E. WILSON, 
Attorney for Defendant, specially 
appearing in support of defen-
dant's motion to quash service. 
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